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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Healthcare investments represent a central social 
infrastructure with growing sustainability issues, 
due to the aging population, and budgetary 
pressures (Holzinger et al., 2015). The term 
sustainability is here considered mainly from an 
economic point of view, but it is a broader concept 
useful for delivering higher quality care with social, 
and environmental implications. 
Public authorities are so pressed to find 
innovative solutions to foster sustainable 
investments (Moro Visconti & Martiniello, 2018), 
outreaching underserved patients that may either be 
cured at home or in “patient-centered” hospitals 
(Gabutti et al., 2017).  
Smart hospitals represent the latest frontier of 
healthcare investments. Their technological features 
are however so advanced that public authorities 
hardly possess the know-how to conceive, build and 
operate them. Synergies with private players are so 
recommended and are naturally consistent with PPP 
backed by PF schemes. 
PPP can be interpreted with a governance 
perspective that considers the stakeholders involved 
in this long-termed investment process. Traditional 
PPP stakeholders like the public or private partner 
and the sponsoring banks (Moro Visconti, 2014) 
represent the cornerstone of any infrastructural PPP 
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This paper explores innovative governance models in the 
healthcare sector. Patients are a key albeit under-investigated 
stakeholder and smart technologies applied to public healthcare 
represent a trendy innovation that reshapes the value-driving 
proposition. This study contributes to the best practice 
improvement in this sector, showing how health governance can 
balance the interests of conflicting stakeholders (patients, staff, 
politicians, private providers, banks, suppliers, etc.) when 
technology-driven (smart) investments are realized. 
Characteristics of smart hospitals are critically examined, and 
governance solutions are considered, together with private actors’ 
involvement and flexible forms of remuneration. Smart hospitals 
are so complicated that they may require sophisticated Public-
Private Partnerships (PPP). Public players lack innovative skills, 
whereas private actors seek additional remuneration for their 
non-routine efforts and higher risk. PPP represents a feasible 
governance framework, especially if linked to Project Financing 
(PF) investment patterns. Results-Based Financing (RBF) softens 
traditional PPP criticalities as availability payment sustainability 
or risk transfer compensation. Waste of public money can 
consequently be reduced, and private bankability improved. 
Patient-centered smart hospitals reshape traditional healthcare 
governance, with savings and efficiency gains that meliorate 
timeliness and execution of cares. Transformation of in-patients 
to out-patients and then home-patients represents, whenever 
possible, a mighty goal. 
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backed by PF. Healthcare investments are however 
peculiar and particularly sensitive to their “clients”, 
represented by patients. 
A patient-centered perspective that considers 
sick persons the barycenter of governance issues is 
so worth investigating and represents the 
background of the research question of this study. 
This paper focuses on how smart healthcare 
investments impact on patients, reshaping 
governance interactions. The study will concentrate 
on PPP/PF investment patterns, to determine if 
public and private interactions best fit risky 
investment patterns. 
The issue of the higher public-to-private 
technological risk transfer will consequently be 
examined, showing that higher private risk needs to 
be compensated with more significant returns to 
make the investment bankable. Higher returns are 
however in contradiction with public budget 
constraints, and they may so derive from 
technology-driven savings. 
Experience shows that unconditional 
availability payments to the private players may 
easily be transformed into undeserved rents. It will 
be shown that RBF can be usefully combined with 
smart hospitals, linking public payments to effective 
private performance. 
This study is multidisciplinary and deals with 
complex networks of stakeholders that rotate 
around patients and are technology-driven.  
We start from the assumption that in smart 
hospital investments preferential recourse to PPP/PF 
and its peculiar characteristics (Moro Visconti, 2017) 
can re-shape governance making it patient centered.  
This paper is organized as follows: smart 
hospitals will be briefly described with a literature 
review, together with their innovative investment 
perimeter and patient-centered issues (paragraph 2). 
The methodology (paragraph 3) is represented to 
provide a set of general rules. These rules consist in 
connected propositions that are illustrated in 
paragraph 4. Paragraph 5 discusses the main 
governance implications and trends and paragraph 6 
contains some concluding remarks. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
The definition of smart hospitals and patient-
centered hospital governance is preparatory to an 
examination of their interactions that drive 
governance patterns. 
“A smart hospital relies on optimized and 
automated processes built on an ICT environment of 
interconnected assets, particularly based on Internet 
of things (IoT), to improve existing patient care 
procedures and introduce new capabilities” (ENISA, 
2016). 
Modern and friendly hospitals, based on smart 
technologies and intelligent facilities, contribute to 
creating a better environment for patients (Bullen 
et al., 2017). 
Being innovative technologies expensive and 
uneasy to conceive and manage, PPP agreements are 
naturally fit to overcome criticalities and PF is an 
original package for investment coverage. Evidence 
(Munksgaard et al., 2012; Meissner, 2015) shows that 
PPP models are increasingly used for Science, 
Technology, and Innovation and then for smart 
infrastructures.  
“Patient-centered care” is healthcare that is 
respectful of, and responsive to, the preferences, 
needs, and values of patients and consumers. Some 
authors (Clarks et al., 2017) try to draw out elements 
of patient-centered care that are important markers 
of successful patient-centered care. They identify six 
factors: (1) Engaging the patient as a whole person; 
(2) Recognizing and responding to emotions; (3) 
Fostering a therapeutic alliance; (4) Promoting an 
exchange of information; (5) Sharing decision-
making; and (6) Enabling continuity of care, self-
management and patient navigation. This approach 
considers the patient as the primary stakeholder and 
identifies the importance of shared governance 
mechanisms.  
A patient-centered approach improves care 
experience and creates public value for services 
(Australian Commission of Safety and Quality in 
Healthcare, 2010).  
Universal healthcare is a public good consistent 
with a PPP framework. Governance of public 
hospitals ought to fulfill the expectations of 
different stakeholders, in a context where the costs 
and the demand for healthcare continue to rise while 
the fiscal resources are limited (Dixit, 2017). 
Digitization of services and consequent 
network interaction is a powerful driver of patient-
centered value co-creation (Rantala & Karjialuoto, 
2016). 
“Last-mile” remote patient monitoring and 
home nursing in constant connection with “first-
mile” healthcare hubs (Larocca et al., 2018) 
represent a trendy pattern that reshapes healthcare 
strategies. Home-patients are the core stakeholders 
of a Patient-Centered Medical Home, a widely-
implemented model for improving primary care, 
emphasizing care coordination, information 
technology, and process improvements (David et al., 
2018).  
The remote care system is the activity best able 
to reduce health costs for example through remote 
cardiac monitoring and remote monitoring for 
chronic diseases like diabetes. Remote patient 
monitoring is a cost-effective strategy (Crossley, 
2017) that can transform in-patients into home-
patients.  
Value-based healthcare, which focuses on 
patient outcomes and the costs of delivering these 
outcomes, can address new challenges. MedTech 
applications re-engineer business models and help 
commissioners, clinicians, and patients to make 
informed decisions (Bullen et al., 2017). 
Big data feed healthcare planning (Archenaa & 
Anita, 2015; Moro Visconti et al., 2018) with timely 
information, making forecasts more realistic and 
resilient.  
The governance implications of the research 
question can be associated to innovative literature 
streams. Currently, corporate governance research 
follows two major routes: classical empirical 
corporate governance research and multidisciplinary 
research. The second is aimed at finding non-
conventional methods to solve existing problems 
(Kostyuk et al., 2018). These methods also include 
the relationship between corporate governance and 
innovation (Belloc, 2012). 
Patient-centered governance and its link with 
technological hospitals in a PPP/PF environment can 
be related to the following corporate governance 
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theoretical frameworks (mentioned in Zattoni & Van 
Ees, 2012; Belloc, 2012), and literature streams: 
 agency theory, based on the principal – 
agent paradigm adapted to PPP, where the public 
control over private management enhances 
corporate performance; 
 transaction cost theory (Williamson, 1979), 
and incomplete contracting at the base of the 
stakeholders’ approach. This theory is consistent 
with a PPP/PF model where the public stakeholders 
must decide between traditional procurement and 
PPP/PF (make it or buy). 
Other theories (institutional, resource 
dependence, behavioral, etc.) could also be linked to 
patient-centered governance. 
Saltman and Duran (2016) focus on the 
emergence of non-state actors with innovative 
procurement models. According to these authors 
health systems are framed within three levels of 
governance: Macro Level, with national level policy 
making functions; Meso Level, consisting of 
institutional level decision making functions, Micro 
level, concerning operation issues. A new model of 
Meso-level provider governance follows three 
different directions: 
1. The reform model/pattern 1 is based on 
traditional government delivery, with a strong 
central government role. This approach has been 
adopted in several countries as England, Norway, 
Portugal, Spain with varying structural 
characteristics. 
2. The reform model/pattern 2 encourages the 
establishment of new private actors, mostly for 
profit. This approach has been adopted in Sweden, 
Norway, Denmark and Finland. 
3. The reform model/pattern 3 combines 
reform model pattern 1 and 2 into a mixed public-
private provider market. This approach has been 
encouraged in central Europe including Estonia and 
Czech Republic. 
In this paper the reform model/pattern 3 is 
considered, and combined with a “new governance” 
approach with the involvement of many 
stakeholders and primarily patient or provider 
associations. 
Patients can actively participate in their 
healthcare and assume higher levels of 
responsibility for their health and wellness which 
can facilitate the development of precision medicine 
and its widespread practice (Chen et al., 2017).  
Chanturidze and Obermann (2016) use the 
framework developed by Saltman and Duran (2016), 
to examine challenges and suggest mitigation 
solutions that might ideally complement specific 
management techniques for effective service 
delivery practices. They define governance as “the 
structures and processes by which the health system 
is regulated, directed and controlled”. Extending the 
concept of Greer et al. (2016) they define governance 
as “The culturally appropriate rules, processes and 
institutions through which decisions are made and 
authority is exercised in order to achieve 
transparency, accountability, participation, integrity, 
and capacity”. Moreover, they extend the governance 
debate beyond the service provider models to health 
financing and funding structures. Regardless of how 
funds are collected and pooled, any publicly 
organized financing scheme faces the challenge of 
“prudent purchasing”. Governing fund pooling, 
resource allocation, health service purchasing, 
together with health service provision are essential 
in achieving such critical, and, at times, conflicting 
aims. 
This paper aims to contribute to the debate 
about how a governance model in the health sector 
might look like.  
In line with cited authors we share the logic of 
PPP neoliberalism with its promise of more 
efficiency and effectiveness. A major role for 
market-oriented healthcare however requires strong 
governance arrangements. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY 
 
This study starts from the debate on Healthcare 
(optimal) Governance and the sustainability issues 
concerned with the need to deliver health care 
following a the triple bottom line i.e. with a financial, 
and environmental social return on investment 
(SROI). It includes innovative tips for delivering 
services, promote health, improve prevention and 
corporate social responsibility, and develop more 
sustainable models of care. 
In particular, it is based on a theoretical model 
that describes some strategic elements to improve 
smart health governance. Two hypotheses are stated 
with consequential propositions. 
H1: Patients are the ultimate beneficiaries of 
governance-driven healthcare value co-creation and 
contribute to improve governance. As a consequence, 
a better governance system is able to give patients or 
their representatives, a stronger role in the system.  
H2: In the presence of growing healthcare needs 
and costs (that contrast with public budget 
constraints) technology creates monetary value 
(optimizing scarce resources) and improves quality of 
cares; but the public stakeholder may lack sufficient 
knowledge to autonomously procure and manage 
technological (smart) solutions so they must be able 
to identify skilled private providers.  
As a consequence, a better governance system 
is able to ensure an optimal risk sharing and RBF 
mechanisms when selecting a private provider. 
Figure 1 shows the interaction of the main 
stakeholders (patients, the public actor, the private 
players and their pivoting SPV, the banks, etc.). 
 
4. ANALYSIS OF THE HYPOTESES 
 
In this section, each hypothesis will be recalled and 
critically examined. 
 
4.1. Hypothesis 1: Patient-centered governance 
 
Patient-centered governance has been broadly 
defined in paragraph 2.  
The idea that patients are the main target of 
healthcare value creation is intuitive and supported 
by growing evidence. The largest U.S. health insurer, 
the Center for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), 
has set a triple aim, concerning better care for 
individuals, better health for populations, and lower 
costs. Simultaneously, major efforts have been 
launched to make care more patient-centered, i.e. 
respectful of and responsive to individual patient 
preferences, and needs.  
Governance implications of the hypothesis 1 
concern two interacting layers of stakeholders: 
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 patients, which represent the fulcrum of a 
patient-centered value chain; 
 complementary stakeholders that rotate 
around the smart hospital infrastructure (public 
and private actors linked by PPP arrangements, 
etc.). 
Whereas the interaction of private stakeholders 
that pivot around the SPV in healthcare PF follows 
traditional corporate governance patterns, public-
private relations are less investigated (Moro Visconti, 
2016), and patient-centered governance issues are, 
to the authors’ knowledge, still undebated. 
 
Figure 1. Smart hospitals: Interaction among the PPP stakeholders along the supply and value chain 
 
 
 
Governance concerns derive from conflicts of 
interests among composite stakeholders. Whereas 
any stakeholder looks for its value for money, 
patients have a peculiar target, consisting of quality 
of cares at affordable costs. While quality is difficult 
to estimate, costs are easier to detect, and they are 
consistent with the Williamson’s transaction cost 
theory. 
Convergence of interests among the different 
stakeholders represents an incentive for value co-
creation. For example, in healthcare PF, the private 
actor has an incentive to properly build the 
infrastructure that has to be run for a long time. 
This quality target benefits the other stakeholders, 
from the better-treated patients to the public player 
or the sponsoring banks. 
New governance mechanisms are also 
necessary to master innovative services that in the 
health sector, and particularly in smart hospitals, are 
‘co-produced’ (Batalden et al., 2015).  
These governance challenges must be examined 
within a technological – smart – environment. They 
concern: 
1. The actors involved. The changing set of 
stakeholders involved in hospital service provision 
challenge the existing rules. Diverse types of market 
failure emerge and need to be managed. New 
operational rules and coordination procedures are 
required. The networks of actors significantly 
broaden, and governance approaches require skilled 
alignment of interests in a dynamic environment. 
2. Data and information asymmetries. State 
and Public operators need to exert some form of 
control to avoid anti-competitive practices over the 
data that drive the smart transition. Data are the 
most valuable commodity in the smart system, and 
represent a public good, particularly sensitive when 
they concern patient information. Data sharing 
through digital platforms reduce information 
asymmetries (Moro Visconti et al., 2017) and 
provides value to patients but needs careful 
monitoring. 
3. Business models and inclusion. The State 
must be the arbiter not only of confidentiality but 
also of healthcare inclusion to avoid discrimination 
in access to ‘Smart health’. 
Patient-centered governance implications are 
focused on targeting efficiency goals, where sick 
persons are adequately treated. Transformation of 
in-patients into out-patients (in daily hospitals) and 
then home-patients (with chronic but locally 
treatable pathologies) is, whenever possible (i.e., in 
the absence of acute treatments) a mighty goal. 
Efficient networking among different 
stakeholders represents a critical strategy for proper 
linkage between healthcare hubs (hospitals for 
major surgery and excellence hotspots) and 
dispensaries or outpatient clinics (Larocca et al., 
2018). In this healthcare re-engineering process, 
technology matters and needs to be fine-tuned with 
existing facilities.  
taxpayers
Public
procurer
private
shareholders
secondary
market
Financial     Supply     Chain
private SPV
sponsoring
banks
PPP arrangement
s
m
a
rt
 
c
o
n
s
tr
u
c
ti
o
n
s
m
a
rt
 
m
a
n
a
g
e
m
e
n
t
patient-
centered 
governance
(home-
patients; 
out-patients; 
in-patients)
toll /
pay for use
pass 
through ...
contracts
supplies
smart 
services
s
m
a
rt
  
in
fr
a
s
tr
u
c
tu
re
sustainable
social / environmental
targets
Operational Supply Chain  linked to Transactional Cost Governance 
RB
risk transfer
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 16, Issue 2, Winter 2019 
 
 
Network theory that links geo-localized 
stakeholders with real spots can be adapted to the 
study of governance criticalities. Networks among 
patients soften information asymmetries and 
contribute to value co-creation through timely 
feedbacks.  
The general theory of network governance 
(Candace et al. 1997) can be useful to explain how 
social mechanisms in network governance reduce 
transaction costs. These authors integrate social 
context into the Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) 
perspective by explaining how social mechanisms 
influence the costs of transacting exchanges. 
Specifically, they show that exchange conditions 
characterized by needs for high adaptation, high 
coordination, and high safeguarding influence the 
emergence of structural embeddedness, explaining 
how structural embeddedness arises and provides a 
foundation for social mechanisms to coordinate and 
safeguard exchanges.  
In the TCE perspective three exchange 
conditions determine which governance form is 
more efficient.  
i) Environmental uncertainty that triggers 
adaptation, which is the "central problem of 
economic organization," because environments are 
rarely stable and predictable 
ii) Asset-specific (or customized) exchanges 
that involve unique equipment, processes, or 
knowledge developed by participants to complete 
exchanges.  
iii) Frequency that is important for three 
reasons. First, it facilitates transferring tacit 
knowledge in customized exchanges, especially for 
specialized processes or knowledge. Second, 
frequent interactions establish the conditions for 
relational and structural embeddedness, which 
provide the foundation for social mechanisms to 
adapt, coordinate, and safeguard exchanges 
effectively. Third, frequent interactions provide cost 
efficiency in using specialized governance structures 
(Williamson, 1985, p. 60). 
In the health sector coordination and 
cooperation among providers and patients for 
customized exchanges is necessary. 
Four conditions are necessary for network 
healthcare governance: (1) demand uncertainty with 
stable supply; (2) customized exchanges high in 
human asset specificity; (3) complex tasks under 
time pressure; and (4) frequent exchanges among 
parties within the network.  
In particular, in smart health “demand 
uncertainty” is generated by rapid changes in 
knowledge or technology, which results in short 
product/service life cycles and makes the rapid 
dissemination of information critical. Understanding 
the sources of uncertainty is important, since they 
influence what governance form is used to 
coordinate and safeguard exchanges. Research on 
environmental uncertainty and governance form 
shows that even modest levels of supply uncertainty, 
combined with predictable product demand, entice 
firms to integrate vertically (Helfat & Teece, 1987). 
In the health sector the need for “Customized 
exchanges” require an organizational form that 
enhances cooperation, proximity, and repeated 
exchanges to transfer effectively tacit knowledge 
among parties. Cooperation among exchange parties 
and in particular between providers and patient, is 
necessary to gain tacit knowledge. 
Technological services supply in health is, by 
definition, complex and subject to time pressure. 
Network governance (even through innovative digital 
platforms) facilitates integrating complementary 
players to offer patient complex services. 
Finally, frequent exchanges and information 
sharing among parties is, again according to TCE 
theory, an important determinant of governance.  
The reduction of transaction costs in healthcare 
investments is driven by strategic, operational and 
governance choices (starting from the dichotomy 
between traditional procurement and PPP). 
Budgeting pressures for cost-cutting in a 
scenario of eldering population with increasing 
healthcare needs constitute a further challenge that 
technology and smart hospitals need to front.  
In this context, big data analysis of sensitive 
healthcare information represents an asset that can 
be usefully employed for the improvement of 
business planning (Moro Visconti et al., 2018), a 
crucial component of long-termed PF. 
The proposition 1 follows hypothesis 1: 
Proposition 1: Stakeholders’ digital networking 
links healthcare hubs to patients in real time. 
Networks between patients and PPP players soften 
information asymmetries and contribute to value co-
creation and reduction of transaction costs through 
timely interactions. 
 
4.2. Hypothesis 2: PPP combination of public 
interest with private technology 
 
PPP are based on competitive auctions where private 
participants have a natural incentive in proposing 
technological advancements. If they do, they can be 
rewarded with higher marks in the tender and 
expected savings in the management phase (Moro 
Visconti, 2016).  
The smart hospital characteristics reshape the 
PF investment perimeter and its operations during 
the management phase. The investment perimeter 
represents the balance sheet structure of the private 
SPV that depends on the features and the 
physical/intangible assets of the healthcare facility. 
Through its innovative Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) 
pattern, the SPV re-engineers its investment 
perimeter. Smart assets are incremental and need to 
be interactively combined with basic facilities since 
the beginning.  
Smart assets reshape operations that follow the 
construction phase in the PF timesheet. Private 
constructors have a governance incentive to 
properly build the hospital, as they then must run it 
for many years. 
Smart functionalities incorporated in 
infrastructural assets concern the e-devices, which 
include the ICT ecosystem for healthcare services to 
home-patients:  
 medical equipment for telemonitoring and 
tele-diagnosis in the form of wearable or 
implantable devices, etc.;  
 medical equipment for distribution of drugs 
(automated dosing equipment, e.g., for insulin) or to 
administer treatment;  
 telehealth equipment, such as cameras, 
sensors, and telephone/internet connections; tele-
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health computer system for patients to self-record 
core health parameters (e.g., blood pressure).  
Biometric or IoT-driven identification systems 
are used to track and authenticate patients, staff or 
hospital equipment such as beds, blood bags or other 
medical items. In smart hospitals, the scanners are 
networked with devices and information systems, 
reducing human errors and improving security.  
Networking equipment provides the 
connectivity backbone to support smart hospitals, 
and mobile client devices are intelligently integrated 
into smart hospitals to make the right information 
available. This process facilitates the mobility of 
staff and patients as in case of mobile client 
applications for smartphones and tablets.  
Buildings and facilities manage various 
functions, for example as power and climate 
regulation systems through temperature sensors. 
Table 1 exemplifies some smart functionalities. 
 
Table 1. Smart functionalities operated by the private concessionaire 
 
1. Reservation 
systems and mobile 
client devices 
Mobile clients (e.g., laptop computers, tablets, smartphones, pagers) 
Mobile applications for smartphones and tablets 
Alarm and emergency communication applications for mobile devices. 
2. Data 
management 
Clinical and administrative patient data (e.g., health records, tests results, contact details) 
Financial, organizational and other hospital data 
Research data (e.g., clinical trial reports) and data intended for secondary use 
Staff data 
Tracking logs 
Vendor details (e.g., contact details, products used). 
3. Hospital equipment 
maintenance 
Power and climate regulation systems, including smart ventilation systems 
Temperature sensors 
Medical gas supply 
Smart patient room operation and management systems, including smart boards, patient screens, 
medical staff screens, etc. 
Automated door lock system including smart locks, lock management applications/tokens and safe 
management software 
4.Interconnected 
clinical information 
systems 
Hospital information systems 
Laboratory information systems 
Radiology, Pharmacy, Pathology information systems 
Blood bank system 
Picture archiving and communication systems 
Research information system. 
5. Networked medical 
devices 
Mobile devices (e.g., glucose measuring devices) 
Wearable external devices (e.g., portable insulin pumps, wireless temperature counters) 
Implantable devices (e.g., cardiac pacemakers) 
Stationary devices (e.g., computer tomography (CT) scanners, life support machines,  
chemotherapy dispensing stations) 
Supportive devices (e.g., assistive robots). 
6. Identification 
systems 
Tags, bracelets, labels and smart badges 
Biometric scanners 
RFID systems with location services (software components) to assess and monitor relative, movement of 
assets/patients/staff, etc. 
CCTV (video surveillance) with recognition/authentication capabilities 
7. Networking 
equipment 
Transmission media 
Network interface cards 
Backbone network devices (e.g., hubs, switches, routers, etc.) 
IoT Gateways which further analyze data collected by devices and send them to cloud data center 
8. Remote-care 
system assets 
Medical equipment for telemonitoring and tele-diagnosis 
Medical equipment for distribution of drugs or to administer treatment 
Telehealth equipment, such as cameras, sensors, and telephone/internet connections 
Telehealth computer system for patients to register their physiological measurements themselves 
 
Interconnected clinical information systems are 
deployed jointly with medical devices and 
identification components to enable smart end-to-
end patient care processes. Moreover, the clinical 
networked information systems are increasingly able 
to make decisions autonomously. Examples include: 
i) Hospital information systems (HIS); ii) Laboratory 
information systems (LIS); iii) Radiology, Pharmacy, 
and Pathology information systems; iv) Blood bank 
system; v) Picture archiving and communication 
systems (PACS); vi) Research information system.  
Data become an asset for decisions, supporting 
all the organizational processes as:  
i) Clinical and administrative patient data 
(e.g., health records, tests results, contact details); 
ii) Financial, organizational and other hospital 
data; 
iii) Research data (e.g., clinical trial reports) and 
data intended for secondary use; 
iv) Staff data.  
A map of the smart functionalities, operated by 
the private concessionaire, is necessary for new 
governance mechanisms that provide optimal 
allocation of risks. Moreover, it is useful to start 
rethinking services on the base of RBF, as it will be 
shown in paragraph 4.2.2. 
The proposition 2 follows hypothesis 2: 
Proposition 2: PPP represents a suitable 
combination of the public interest in healthcare with 
the technological expertise of private suppliers. 
 
4.2.1. Technology and public-to-private risk transfer 
 
Technological PPP consistent with Proposition 2 
concern additional risk that has to be shared 
between the public and private players. 
Risk transfer is a crucial characteristic of PPP, 
especially if Eurostat rules apply. For public entities, 
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the accounting framework was initially based 
primarily on a ‘risk and reward’ criterion described 
in the Eurostat Decision 2004 and then fully 
regulated by the implementation of ESA 2010 
(Manual on Government Deficit and Debt (Eurostat, 
2016), Chapter IV.5 Treatment of PPP). 
Manual on Government Deficit and Debt and 
Eurostat decisions (2016) try to solve the critical 
question of whether a PPP should be accounted ‘on 
balance’ and when it can be considered ‘off balance’ 
for the grantor. The ‘risks and rewards’ criterion 
drives the decision of how to classify the 
infrastructure in the public accounts.  
The assets should be considered non-
governmental (‘off balance’) when the private 
partner bears the construction risk, and at least one 
of either the availability or the demand risk. 
Traditional healthcare PF was criticized for its 
inability to correctly transfer risk, often producing 
an on-balance accounting treatment of hospital 
infrastructure (Shaoul et al., 2008).  
For the public procurer, on-balance 
investments increase the public debt and are so 
hardly viable. This is the case especially when the 
public grants for constructions exceed 50% of the 
expenditures or when contract penalties are judged 
by Eurostat to be insufficient to transfer the 
availability risk fully. 
On the contrary, construction risk is 
substantially transferred to the private partner when 
the latter has capital at risk during the construction 
phase and when availability risk is transferred 
through the provision of severe penalties in case of 
underperformance.  
Moreover, PPP was judged, in some cases, a 
disaster (Acerete et al., 2012) because of substantial 
public costs and a government still bearing most of 
the risk. 
We wonder how smart hospitals PF can ensure 
a better risk transfer providing at the same time 
much wanted innovation.  
To stimulate innovation, each party assuming 
project risk should share the benefits that arise 
from innovation. Barlow and, Kobler-Gaiser (2008) 
argue that under traditional PF it was difficult to 
achieve agreement on the introduction of innovative 
ideas because of a separation of responsibilities 
between the project consortium and clinical 
operations. Whereas the primary goal was a facility 
delivering excellent healthcare to its patients, for the 
private partners a hospital project was mainly seen 
as an investment vehicle.  
This mismatch in incentives resulted in more 
cautious attitudes towards risk, mainly when 
associated with innovative solutions. Many authors 
(Barlow et al., 1997 and 2000; Slaughter, 2000, 
Leiringer, 2006) found an unwillingness of the 
private partner to assume any additional risk 
associated with innovation.  
Other authors consider PF a suitable 
instrument for financing innovation (Chirkunova 
et al., 2016). 
In smart healthcare, innovation is at the base of 
the PPP, being contractually stated from the 
beginning of the awarding procedure. Smart PF 
schemes must be designed to minimize contractual 
uncertainties, envisaging a clear risk transfer.  
In this context, it is necessary to outline new 
governance mechanisms in which the role and 
responsibility of each subject is contractually 
identified, remembering that the private partner 
bears an additional operational risk. 
In smart hospitals, the private player takes 
construction risk (where technology is embedded 
since inception) and demand risk for “hot” 
(commercial activities), which include smart 
applications. Availability risk needs to be interpreted 
innovatively, adapting it to the real functionality of 
the smart infrastructure during the operational 
phase.  
Table 2 compares traditional PF with smart 
investments. Table shows how smart hospital PF 
allows a more intensive risk transfer (compared to 
traditional PF) particularly in availability risk, with 
the possibility, to provide additional rewards for the 
greater risk exposure of the private actors. 
Figure 2 shows the perimeter of innovation. 
In traditional PF the design is sourced from 
public feasibility studies that shape the tender, 
limiting public-private confrontation, and 
opportunities for innovation are limited. In smart 
hospitals, private involvement is anticipated in the 
design of the infrastructure, and innovation 
becomes a vital task of the private partner. 
Moreover, because in smart hospitals higher 
risks are transferred, it is easier to demonstrate that 
the “majority of risks” is covered by the private 
partner, in compliance with Eurostat rules. 
Contractual agreements and penalties strictly linked 
to results (and consistent with the RBF approach 
examined in paragraph 4.2.2.) will consequently 
allow off-balance accounting of the assets.  
The annual availability fee, recognized by the 
grantor to the private operator of the smart hospital, 
will consequently represent a current expense for 
the public administration recognized on the base of 
measurable performance, even on an RBF basis. 
When caring for a patient through Smart 
Technologies, specialized knowledge and 
responsibility are needed, and this compels the 
industry into a networked mode of operation, with 
risk-reward sharing needs. 
Adequate risk transfer from traditional to 
smart investments PPP programs needs to be 
properly executed since inception to avoid failures.  
The introduction of additional risk in the 
model brings to a new sub-proposition: 
Proposition 2a: Healthcare PPP/PF criticalities 
also concern insufficient public-to-private risk 
transfer. Technological risk exacerbates the 
problem, and its transfer to the private stakeholders 
needs to be compensated with higher returns also to 
properly reward the private partner and its 
sponsoring banks. 
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Table 2. Public and private risk-sharing in traditional and smart PF 
 
Risks Traditional PF Smart PF 
Construction 
risk 
 The SPV is mainly a construction company. 
 The contract allocates construction risks 
on the base of a standard risk matrix. 
 The SPV includes partners with an expertise in smart 
technologies and IoT (e.g. MedTech companies). 
 A public/private coordination committee ensures joint 
management in design and construction phases.  A new risk 
matrix is provided. 
Availability 
risk 
Transfer of the following risks: 
1) availability of the infrastructural assets 
(rooms, operational rooms, etc.); 
2) maintenance costs of the buildings; 
3) maintenance costs of the equipment. 
Transfer of the following additional risks: 
1. Reservation services on mobile and electronic payments. 
This well-established technology can reduce waiting lists 
and ensure higher productivity with personnel cost savings. 
This risk can be completely transferred to the private 
partner. 
2. Data management and dematerialization. This 
technology can simplify the administrative management of 
hospitals with significant cost savings related to paper 
reduction, the filing of documents, etc. This risk can be 
completely transferred to the private partner. 
3. Hospital equipment maintenance 
4. Computerized management of medical records for an 
interconnected Clinical Information Systems. This is a 
shared activity because only the technical risk can be 
transferred to a private partner. 
5. Hospital equipment maintenance software to optimize 
technical control. This software allows tracking history for 
all the inventory items. Tracking is used to pinpoint general 
trends in resource allocation within a specific department. It 
is so possible to catch unnecessary activities and 
expenditures on idle equipment and cut down costs. This 
action will make possible to save time as well as 
maintenance expenses spent on handling the hospital 
equipment. This risk can be completely transferred to the 
private partner. 
6. Networked medical devices. This technology allows the 
implant an IT control of external and implantable devices 
(e.g., cardiac pacemakers). This is a shared risk activity 
because only the technical risk can be transferred to the 
private partner. 
7. Remote care system management. These technologies 
can lower health costs for example in case of chronical 
cases. This is a shared risk activity because only the 
technical risk can be transferred to a private partner. 
8. Cybersecurity. 
Demand risk/ 
commercial 
services 
Management by one or more traditional 
operators. 
Integrated and automated management of newsstands, 
vending machines for drinks and food, advertising inside the 
hospital, rental of televisions and other devices for patients, 
supplementary services to improve the hospitality. 
 
Figure 2. Innovative flow-charts in smart hospitals 
 
 
 
Corporate Ownership & Control / Volume 16, Issue 2, Winter 2019 
 
 
4.2.2. Technological risk and returns: Making the 
availability payment sustainable with RBF 
 
The general issue indicated in proposition 2a – 
higher private remuneration due to higher 
technological risk – can be incorporated in a 
narrower question, related to the sustainability of 
the public-to-private availability payment during the 
management phase. 
As anticipated in sub-paragraph 4.2.1., risk 
transfer is a critical issue in PF and raises the 
following trade-off: 
 from the public side, there is a necessity to 
transfer a higher risk component to the private 
player, because of a stricter interpretation of 
Eurostat rules but also considering that innovative 
investments are riskier than standard ones; 
 from the private side, a higher risk may 
decrease profitability and raise bankability concerns 
(Moro Visconti, 2014).  
In PF, the availability payment remunerates the 
SPV with “cold” revenues that do not depend on 
market risk like “hot” commercial revenues. 
In traditional healthcare PF, availability 
payments to the private actor depend on the 
possibility for the public player to use a well-
functioning hospital. Contractual provisions link the 
availability payments to the meeting of binding 
quality standards. If they are not (entirely) met, the 
fee is either decreased or stopped. 
Healthcare providers operate in a pay-for-
service model. There is an incentive to provide more 
services than necessary. As treatments improve by 
applying innovative technologies, these incentives 
could be removed by changing to a pay-by-success 
model. RBF goes in the direction of “paying for 
performance” (Campbell et al., 2007), ensuring more 
patient-centered management, and is consistent with 
Value-Based healthcare delivery. 
How to achieve an improved outcome at lower 
costs is a challenging area of study. Kaplan and 
Porter (2017) conclude that “we need to change the 
nature of competition so it would reward those who 
deliver the highest value for patient”. Value is 
defined a “better outcome achieved at lower costs” 
and the authors propose to accelerate the outcome 
measurement in health by applying time driven 
activity-based costing along the care cycle. 
In this context, the burden of the affordability 
of the availability payment emerges as a critical 
long-term consequence of PF schemes where private 
remuneration (also considering the public grants 
and the revenues from “hot” commercial operations) 
may become hardly sustainable. 
For example, UK hospital trust annual 
payments to the private partner were higher than 
expected. Shaoul et al. (2008) estimated an 
additional cost of PF finance, for 12 hospitals in the 
UK, of about 60M £ per year, corresponding to 20-
25% of the trust income. They found extremely 
difficult for hospitals to penalize deficient 
performance and effectively transfer risk. Moreover, 
because the demand risk was not fully transferred, 
and the private partner was mainly treated as a 
finance debtor, a minor risk was passed from the 
trust to the private. These criticalities led to a wave 
of mistrust in PF, and in Build-Operate-Transfer 
procedures. 
The idea of remunerating smart hospital 
services with availability payments on the base of 
management results also bears unknown 
criticalities. Traditional criticism over availability 
payment affordability (Henjewele et al., 2011) may 
so be exacerbated or reduced. 
Risk can however be softened, up to an ideal 
complete elimination, making it flexible, i.e., linked 
to performance and results. This strategy reduces 
private rents (free riding) but also allows for higher 
compensation, whenever it is deserved. 
This goal is neither easy nor immediate, and 
satisfactory results depend upon a well-structured 
supply chain and a flexible agreement between the 
involved parties ensuring the optimal allocation of 
risks and fair compensation of private investments 
linked to concrete results. 
Smart PF sustainability can be partly based on 
availability payments in which risks are ultimately 
operational, intrinsically manageable and dependent 
on the performance and management of the private 
partner. Operational performance can be monitored 
with a comparison with standard costs for the same 
task, within a transaction cost framework.  
As an example, a private operator in charge of 
the implementation of telemedicine systems and 
distance monitoring of patients could be 
remunerated on the base of the number of patients 
treated with the new system, with a “shadow toll” 
mechanism (public to private payment without the 
involvement of the patients). 
Smart healthcare can perform many tasks in a 
better way, generating public savings that can be 
partially assigned to private remuneration.  
Managing by objectives is a strategy consistent 
with RBF that requires:  
1) defining the appropriate number of 
indicators that work as objectives;  
2) choosing a correct principle to determine 
which indicators should be considered as high 
priorities.  
Savedoff (2010) focuses on the range of RBF 
approaches, much larger and diverse than ever 
before. In short, a relevant decision in RBF is based 
on input (pay for services), output (pay for useful 
results) or outcomes (pay for useful results). 
This approach must be associated with 
payments mechanisms as: 
 fee-for-service: providers are paid a fee for 
each service that they render to a patient; 
 case-based payments: providers are paid a 
fee for each treated case, independently of the type 
or intensity of services that are required and 
rendered;  
 capitation: providers are paid a fixed 
amount for each person enrolled in their care and 
are expected to render all the services needed by 
that individual during the term of enrollment. 
Some of these approaches best fit with smart 
hospitals PPP. Typical measurable indicators are i) 
the number of reservation via mobile; ii) the number 
of electronic payments; iii) the number of 
dematerialized processes; iv) the savings in prints 
and paper; v) the level of productivity per employee; 
vi) the cost of maintenance.  
Fees for service payments can be provided and 
incentives recognized when specific performance 
targets are achieved as a certain percentage (on the 
total) of reservations are made through IT systems 
or the number of default of the equipment is 
reduced. 
Health systems and patient management 
present criticalities in the coordination between 
technological performance and medical activities. In 
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this field of activities, RBF should be accordingly 
based on specified outcomes verified for quality and 
only occasionally on outputs. 
Typical measurable indicators are: i) the 
number of medical records available online; ii) the 
number of doctors and staff that access 
systematically electronic records; iii) the number of 
patients using implantable devices; iv) the number 
of patients using a remote care system, etc. 
For some of these activities “Case-Based 
Payments” or “Capitation” can be appropriate and 
incentives should be recognized when specific 
quality targets are achieved, or high patient 
satisfaction is reported. In this case, incentives 
should include both technical and medical staff, 
extending the rewarded stakeholders beyond private 
investors or patients. 
Successful RBF programs must introduce a 
material incentive but also help to:  
 align objectives between the grantor and the 
IT providers; 
 collect reliable information on results; 
 give both private operators and medical 
staff an incentive for their efforts, and higher 
discretion to carry out their tasks.  
RBF has the potential to be usefully employed 
in smart PF investments, softening the sustainability 
issues of availability payments and transferring 
operational risk from the public to the private part, 
in compliance with Eurostat rules. 
RBF can help to strengthen healthcare systems, 
making them more accountable and delivering 
higher value for money by shifting the focus from 
inputs to results. RBF can contribute to reinforcing 
PPP, aligning private providers with national health 
policy goals. These general statements can be 
applied even to the peculiar case of smart hospitals, 
where innovative technicalities need to be 
harmonized with resilient supply chains.  
RBF introduces checks and balances along the 
delivery chain, encouraging better governance, 
transparency and enhanced accountability. 
Linking availability payments to RBF can soften 
affordability issues, transferring a higher risk to the 
private side, in compliance with Eurostat rules. 
Since RBF produces higher returns (if deserved), 
there is a remuneration of the private extra-risk. 
Proposition 2b synthetizes these findings: 
Proposition 2b: Higher private remuneration for 
the extra-risk transferred (proposition 2a) is in 
contrast with public budget constraints (hypothesis 2). 
A solution can be given by the technology-driven 
extra-savings that fuel RBF-returns, to be shared 
between the public and the private stakeholders. 
 
5. DISCUSSION 
 
Healthcare systems throughout the world undergo 
significant changes driven by aging populations, 
budget constraints, and advances in biomedical 
technologies (Chen et al., 2017; Clarke et al., 2017).  
With this trade-off between tightening budgets 
and skyrocketing costs, many countries are seeking 
to identify ways of using ICT and introducing new 
procurement models. In this context the private role 
is increasing and needs adequate governance rules. 
This study identifies the importance of 
governance best practices at the three different level 
identified by Saltman and Duran, 2016 (Macro-Meso-
Micro) and the importance of a new provider model 
in which public institutions negotiate PPP contracts 
with skilled private providers. This produces 
governance implications due to more complex form 
of shared ownership and the necessity to coordinate 
heterogeneous stakeholders. 
Moreover, as different cities and regions have 
not uniform starting points in terms of healthcare 
systems, targets and governance, converging 
transition is needed. The evolution requires 
continuous adaptation, and, governments will 
continue to bear significant agency costs. These 
costs can be reduced by providing a governance 
framework with three layers, as illustrated in 
Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Strategic governance layers 
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Two main hypotheses have been illustrated: 
1. Healthcare needs to be patient-centred. 
2. Cost-cutting technology is better managed 
by private actors.  
The first hypothesis assumes the importance of 
a patient – centered healthcare examining how 
shared decision processes and network dynamics 
can improve healthcare quality and ensure joint 
value co-creation. Since networks of actors broaden 
in smart environments, governance needs to adapt 
to pursue alignment of interests (in operations, 
procedures, economic and quality targets, etc.) and 
value co-creation. 
In this context patient associations can be 
usefully involved in decisional processes both at a 
“meso” and “micro” level. At meso level 
stakeholders will define the type and quality of 
services contractually agreed in the PPP. At micro 
level they will settle operational solutions for the 
integration of technology and digital capabilities. 
Proposition 1 is a consequence of this framework. 
The second hypothesis assumes that 
technology change is better managed by private 
operators. 
Furthermore, since value for money represents 
a crucial aspect of PPP/PF initiatives, its application 
to the patients’ targets is fully consistent with smart 
initiatives where quality is enhanced, and costs may 
be reduced. From a governance perspective, this 
scenario is compliant with the transaction cost 
theory. 
Smart hospital PPPs are based on competitive 
auctions where private participants have a natural 
incentive in proposing technological advancements. 
The combination of the public interest in healthcare 
with the technological expertise of private suppliers 
has been delineated in the proposition 2. 
The public operator cannot give up with its role 
of control especially when additional risk must be 
shared between the public and private players. 
Adequate risk transfer from traditional to 
smart investments PPP programs needs to be 
properly executed since inception.  
The introduction of risk in the model brought 
to a new sub-proposition 2a. 
Furthermore, risk can be softened, if linked to 
performance and results. This strategy reduces 
private rents (free riding) but also allows for higher 
compensation, whenever it is deserved. 
Smart PF sustainability can be partly based on 
availability payments in which risks are ultimately 
operational, intrinsically manageable and dependent 
on the performance and management of the private 
partner. Operational performance can be monitored 
with a comparison with standard costs for the same 
task. 
RBF introduces checks and balances along the 
delivery chain, encouraging better governance, 
transparency and enhanced accountability. 
Since the 2000s, many scholars have been 
investigating the reasons behind failures of RBF, with 
a focus on the public sector (Van Thiel & Leeuw, 
2002). 
Linking availability payments to RBF can soften 
affordability issues, transferring a higher risk to the 
private side. RBF can contribute to reinforcing PPP, 
aligning private providers with national health 
policies to attain public health goals. 
Since RBF can produce higher returns, there is a 
possible remuneration of the private extra-risk as 
stated in proposition 2b. 
Innovation involves administrative processes as 
reservation systems, IT data management, 
dematerialization of “paperless” archives and 
software for equipment maintenance. Product and 
process innovation are to be combined and 
synchronized, re-engineering the supply and value 
chain where healthcare ICT is the converging digital 
platform. Innovation becomes a driver of cost-
cutting policies and “smart” long-term savings. The 
impact of technology on health expenses is 
controversial. Technology may increase costs, but it 
dramatically improves quality of care and life 
expectancy. In many applications, technology can 
however contribute to savings (Kumar, 2018), 
especially for chronic patients that are remotely 
monitored.  
To the extent that these savings are 
measurable, they can be partially converted by 
National Health Service or other Healthcare bodies 
into RBF resources that back PF initiatives. 
Savings are obtained by rethinking the core 
function of hospitals:  
1) increasing labor productivity and process 
efficiency; 
2) reducing several categories of costs;  
3) reducing the duration of hospital stays 
while preserving the occupancy rate and the quality 
of health services. 
A smart hospital needs significant investments 
in both tangible and intangible assets (servers, IoT-
driven devices, software, information security, etc.) 
together with the new and effective governance of 
the IT and other internal processes.  
These investments can drive to the following 
economic and non-economic results: 
1) optimization of admissions, scheduling, and 
other processes, resulting in a seamless patient flow. 
The new, more automated processes increase labor 
productivity and reduce personnel and management 
costs; 
2) optimization of assets maintenance (with 
warning IoT sensors) that diminishes yearly assets 
costs with quantifiable savings and reduced errors; 
3) computerized medical record and 
interconnected clinical information, which ensures a 
more efficient healthcare thanks to the availability 
of patient information. Together with networked 
medical devices, these systems increase the quality 
of medical treatments reducing the duration of 
hospital stays, with an impact on daily cost for the 
patient. 
Building a smart hospital is more than bringing 
together connected devices on a high-speed 
networking infrastructure. It means rethinking and 
fully re-engineering the care process, management 
system, and governance. Technology and digital 
capabilities need to be fully integrated into day-to-
day functioning. This is challenging to implement 
across a fast-moving, complex organization like a 
hospital, in a highly networked healthcare system.  
In this context it is essential to identify an 
applicable operational framework and an innovative 
and effective governance model. 
Health systems in many countries are moving 
away from traditional procurement, which is based 
on clinical preference and price, and towards a more 
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holistic perspective that factors in quality and total 
costs across the product life-cycle. This shift is 
opening doors for new partnerships with private 
providers and Medical technology (MedTech) 
companies.  
MedTech corporations are growing fast because 
of the pressure to reduce healthcare costs, the 
increasing power of economic stakeholders in 
purchasing decisions and the ubiquity of 
information. 
Despite consistent investments in the short run 
for startup technology, long term savings can be 
enormous, regarding the lower mobility of patients, 
instantaneity of care at home, decreased hospital 
infections, time savings converted in work activities, 
etc. The width of the worldwide healthcare market is 
a further propellant for economies of scale and 
experience. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
 
The inevitable transition to smart technologies will 
have a significant impact on healthcare processes 
and their governance in all countries. New actors, 
networks, and innovation are already challenging 
consolidated health governance practices.  
This study provides some tips to detect and 
soften governance criticalities and increase 
sustainability of smart healthcare investments. Much 
attention begins to be dedicated to a “Sustainable 
Healthcare” also through the creation in some 
countries as UK of “Sustainable Development Units” 
to help healthcare organisations think about the 
medium- and long-term future, and understand and 
prepare for their changing role. 
Evidence shows that healthcare systems of the 
developed economies find it difficult to cope with 
ageing population in the presence of budget 
constraints driven by the public debt burden. 
A partial solution to this vital issue is 
represented by technology that is revolutionizing 
medicine and healthcare. Smart hospitals are the 
infrastructural cornerstone of this trend, but they 
raise many unconventional governance concerns. 
Healthcare is undergoing a paradigm shift, and 
governance issues mainly rotate around patients, 
who are painfully becoming the pivoting 
stakeholder.  
The thesis of this paper is that whereas the 
public player maintains a vital role in safeguarding 
health as a primary “public good”, it may lack the 
expertise to promote and run technological – smart – 
investments. This assumption is valid worldwide as 
PPP and RBF are well-known and increasingly used 
instruments. 
Hence the growing importance of PPP, where 
public actors interact with private players. 
Healthcare PPP investments, backed by PF patterns, 
are consolidated in many developed and catching up 
economies (Moro Visconti et al., 2017), although they 
preserve some criticalities. Among them, insufficient 
public-to-private risk transfer can exacerbate public 
budget concerns. 
Smart investments imply higher operational 
risk, aggravating public-private sharing issues. 
Public players are so forced to transfer more 
standard and technological risk to the private actors, 
whereas the latter need to compensate it with extra-
returns, even to soften bankability issues. But extra 
public payments face the budget pressures. 
A solution can be represented by the savings 
and efficiency gains that technology produces, 
reshaping consolidated business models. Some 
countries are more advanced than others but all 
need to settle the risk-reward transfer issues, by 
sharing it between the public and the private 
stakeholders. RBF is routinely applied in healthcare 
to link remuneration to performance, minimizing 
opportunistic rents. It may so represent a partial 
solution to these intricate problems and to their 
related governance concerns.  
Limitations of this study concern the lack of 
data and empirical evidence able to test the 
described model at several levels. At macro-level by 
investigating the new skills needed by health 
professionals. At meso-level by investigating already 
existing accountability and risk sharing practices in 
more advanced countries. At micro-level by looking 
for examples of already working smart hospitals.  
Further investigation over the theory of the 
“healthcare” firm and its peculiar stakeholders is 
also needed, considering the impact of telemedicine 
and e-health on the supply and value chain. Digital 
platforms where connected stakeholders interact 
and co-create value should reduce information 
asymmetries and soften risk. This is however 
another under-investigated area. 
Future research avenues should address the 
governance shift promoted by the use of private 
providers for technological innovation. “Evidence 
based health policy” should accordingly be brought 
into the governance debate (Chanturidze & 
Obermann, 2016). Customization to specific country 
issues – backed by emerging empirical evidence – 
remains a practical target for on-site 
implementation. 
Furthermore, new research should address the 
government culture and purchasing methods shift 
necessary to promote technological innovation. 
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